The use of the concept of control over the act to distinguish between principal and accomplice in criminal law was pioneered by several German authors, including H. Bruns, Hellmuth v. Weber, Eb. Schmidt, Lobe, and eventually Welzel. In the 1930s, Welzel incorporated the concept into action theory.
Later, the theory of control over the act reached a more sophisticated development through the work of Claus Roxin, a distinguished emeritus professor at the University of Munich. Beginning in the 1960s, Roxin outlined three forms in which an individual could exert control over the act:
- Control Over the Action: Occurs when the agent directly commits the offense, thus acting as the principal and not merely as an instigator or accomplice.
- Control Over the Will: Applies when an immediate perpetrator commits the act under error or coercion, with their will controlled by a secondary agent (indirect perpetrator). This extends to organized structures of power, where the indirect perpetrator wields control over others’ actions.
- Functional Control Over the Act: Grounds co-perpetration through the division of roles and responsibilities among principals.
These carefully developed theories were never intended to dilute the rigorous evidentiary analysis required in criminal proceedings. However, during the trial of Criminal Action 470 in Brazil, the theory was misinterpreted and misused, creating the impression that it allowed convictions based on circumstantial evidence tied to hierarchical positions within power structures.
While evidence-based convictions in criminal cases are admissible, the misuse of this theory to justify decisions based on presumptions of involvement fundamentally misconstrues its purpose. The theory of control over the act is meant to distinguish between principals and accomplices, not to serve as a substitute for thorough evidentiary analysis.
A correct application of this theory can be observed in the Peruvian Supreme Court’s conviction of former President Alberto Fujimori. Fujimori was deemed an indirect principal for crimes committed by fully responsible members of the state’s repressive apparatus during his administration. The Court relied on four criteria derived from Roxin’s formulation: Fujimori’s authority to issue orders, the unlawful nature of the power structure, the replaceability of immediate perpetrators, and their readiness to commit the crimes. These elements established Fujimori’s control over the will of the direct perpetrators, distinguishing him as an indirect principal rather than an accomplice.
In contrast, the Brazilian Supreme Court’s use of this theory in Criminal Action 470 was both decontextualized and vague. Claims of “final” or “functional” control over the act were made without clearly defining the theory’s application. Moreover, Roxin’s theory of organized power structures explicitly pertains to organizations operating outside the law—such as terrorist groups or rogue states—not legally recognized political parties.
The theory of control over the act, misrepresented as a novelty in this case, became a pretext for significant shifts in legal interpretation. Its application as a justification for unsubstantiated decisions illustrates a fundamental misunderstanding of its purpose.
Fernanda Lara Tórtima is a criminal lawyer and chair of the Committee on Prerogatives at the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB-RJ).